Wars And Sustainable Development In Nigeria: Perspectives From Nigerian- Biafran War And Boko Haram Insurgency

Abstract
This work examines similarities between the Nigerian Civil War and the Boko Haram insurgence; identified the critical consequences of both; and made recommendations for sustainable socioeconomic development of the communities and the nation. Secondary sources of data and information were used. The work discusses the Civil War; and unraveles the status of the Boko Haram insurgency. It establishes both of them as “wars.” It reiterates that the origins of the Biafran/Nigeria Civil War stemmed from the 1914 forced amalgamation of the diverse and distinct ethnic groups into a single nation. Boko Haram can be understood in the context of Nigeria‟s current conditions: Africa‟s most populous nation, largest economy and biggest oil producer, but astounding levels of corruption left it with neither basic development nor infrastructures. Disparities between the North and the South are also important in understanding the conflict. The consequences of “the wars” include superfluous increase in security votes; destruction of national corporate image; food scarcity; sporadic migration and abandonment of profession, heightened indigenes/settlers‟ dichotomy; discouragement of investors; dehumanisation of people; deterioration of the economy; palpable fear among citizens; collapse of tourism industry; and increase in school drop outs. The insurgency has left many homeless, hungry, sick and in abject poverty and without future. War should be prevented, and an end should come to the incidence of insurgency. The lingering disenchantment of the civil war needs to be eliminated, and the internally displaced people should be offered security, resettled and empowered.
Keywords: Boko Haram insurgency, Civil War, socioeconomic development, sustainability

Introduction
Some conflicts are passed down from generation to generation, either because of their sizes, or because they seethe at a low boil with little ferocity (Bowley, 2001). Others were ostensibly declared wars that never ended due to various diplomatic irregularities or political quirks (Donald, 2009; Duncan, 2004). In either case, there are some wars known to be longest in history (Fisk, 2005). These include the Punic Wars (2,248 Years), Taiwan vs. the Netherlands (359 years), 335 Years War, Arauco Wars (around 290 years), Kuril Islands Dispute (160 years and counting), Huescar vs. Denmark (142 years), Hundred Years War (116 years), Montenegro vs. Japan (101 years), Town Line, New York vs. the United States (84 years), Kashmir Conflict (67 2 years and counting), Burmese Civil War (67 years and counting), and North Korea vs. South
Korea (65 years and counting).In fact, the longest war in history, the Punic Wars, lasted over two thousand years - but only had 80 years of combat (Bowley, 2001). Another incredibly long war, the 335 Years War, never had a shot fired and had been forgotten about until a ceremonial treaty was signed ending it.
Some of the conflicts that have lasted for decades have seen incredible violence, massacres and bloodshed. There is nothing exciting about the longest war, and these wars lasted longer than 30 years, either because they just dragged on for a long time or there was never an official peace treaty. Often, they ended with destruction of lives and property, and mayhems (Rothschild, 2018a). Conversely, there were wars that Rothschild (2018b) referred to as the Shortest Wars in History. Border disputes, tensions over ethnic populations, trade issues, hangovers from the two world wars or long-simmering pent-up hostilities have all exploded into shooting wars - many lasting just a few weeks or even a few days. In one case, the war was over in less than an hour.

However, this work has examined the Nigerian Civil War in Southeast Nigeria and the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast; and the effects of both on sustainability of the respective regions and the nation at large. It made suggestions for an end to insurgency and sustainable socioeconomic development. Secondary sources of data and information were used.

The Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970)
Though there were many causes, the primary origins of the Biafran-Nigeria Civil War stemmed from the forced British amalgamation of the over 250 diverse and distinct ethnic groups and two separate provinces, Northern Province Protectorate and the Southern Province Protectorate into the single nation of Nigeria(Shelton, 2005). According to him, since the beginning of the amalgamation, calls for secession from Nigerian went out from different ethnic groups. The disparities arising from differences between British treatment of the two provinces was pointed out by Sir Hugh Clifford, Governor General of Nigeria, who stated that while Southern Province Nigerians were educated to the extent that skilled labour was readily available and many Nigerians had become professionals (like doctors and lawyers), there seemed to be no Northern Province Nigerians who had been literate nor sufficiently educated to enable them fill the most
minor clerical post in the office of any government department. This explains the extent to which history, traditions, ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social, and religious barriers have all hampered the creation of a unified state of Nigeria. At the advent of independence, in October 1960, when Great Britain gave colonial power to Nigeria (forty-six years after amalgamation), three regions (based on ethnic groupings) were created to comprise the independent nation of Nigeria. Broadly, the Hausa/Fulani were to the north; the Yoruba were to the west; and the Igbo were to the east.

As reflected in a declaration made by an Eastern Military Governor, Lieutenant Colonel Chukumeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, there was inter-ethnic domination: "The brutal and planned annihilation of officers of Eastern Nigeria origin had cast serious doubt as to whether they could ever sincerely live together as members of a nation, " triggered the Nigerian Civil War. The disputed post-independence election in 1964 and the explosive western regional elections in 1965 worsened the existing ethnic hostilities. These deepened secessionist agitations and triggered the first military coup of 15th January, 1966 led by the Eastern Region. Though Nzeogwu's coup killed Nigerian Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and others, no Eastern Igbo were killed. This triggered the accusation that the coup was not political but rather ethnic and that the Igbo of the East were aiming for ethnic domination over North and South. Later in 1966, a countercoup led by Major-General Johnson Umunakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi (an ethnic Igbo) abolished the federal structure and introduced a unitary system of government.

However, a "revenge coup" on 29th July, 1966 resulted in the assassination of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi at Ibadan, and that put an end to his unitary government.
A summit of military leaders of the opposing factions was held at Aburi, Ghana in1967.
The summit agreed to a confederation system of government. The agreement was never implemented. Therefore, after failed efforts to negotiate peace, on 30th May, 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, unilaterally declared independence from Nigeria. The new independent nation was called Biafra after the Bight of Biafra. The Biafran/Nigerian Civil War commenced and it was fought mostly on the Biafran territory.
The conquest of Owerri on 6th January, 1970 signaled the collapse of Biafra's resistance, and thus ended the Civil War. It was the Biafran Chief of Army Staff, Major General Phillip Effiong that surrendered to the Nigerian government, stating Biafra's physical and psychological surrender with the following: "We are firm, we are loyal Nigerian citizens and accept the authority of the Federal Military Government. We accept the existing administrative and political structure of the federation of Nigeria. The Republic of Biafra hereby ceases to exist" (Shelton, 2005). Colonel Yakubu Dan-Yumma Gowon, the Head of State of Nigeria, accepted Biafra's unconditional surrender and began the programmes of Reunion, Reform, and Restoration. He declared there was “no victor and no vanquished.” While there was international debate over whether the Nigerian Civil War had represented genocide of the Igbo people, it was determined
by the international community that while the death and destruction reached devastating proportions, the intent of the government was not systematic destruction of a targeted people in genocide, but a determined effort to end secession and thereby preserve a unified nation of Nigeria (Shelton, 2005). He asserted that “there were massive civilian deaths and property destruction. Strongly outnumbered and fighting against superior technology, the Biafrans were surrounded, secluded and blocked by the pro-independent Nigerian forces. The consequence was famishment, physique massive death, and displacement of the Igbo from their ancestral homes.”
With the Nigerian blockade cutting off the Biafrans from their expected source of oil income, the Biafrans suffered loss of life and starvation.
According to Shelton (2005), “the outcomes of the aftermath of the Civil War in the Reconciliation, Reconstruction, and Rehabilitation programmes achieved some of the desperately overdue goals of a unified Nigeria, though fulfilment of promises was aborted by subsequent corruption and further military coups,” namely:- resettlement of displaced Igbo in permanent residences in the region;

- physical, emotional, and political rehabilitation of soldiers and the displaced civilians;
- reconstruction of destroyed infrastructures (roads, railways, communications, schools, hospitals, etc) and other public buildings;
- correction of economic and social problems of poverty, malnourishment, diseases (especially preventable diseases), ignorance and lack of educational opportunities (in contrast to the abundant opportunities in the Southern area), war relief food, medicine, shelter;
- establishment of civilian government and extinguishing of military government on 1st October, 1975;
- conducting a well operated, non-controversial national census;
- drafting a new national constitution;
- holding honest elections; and
- creation of states according to the 1967 agreement on implementing a confederation system of government.
However, it can never be the same. The impact of the war in the overall development of the territory is still obvious and there are likelihoods that it will still be noticeable in decades to come.

Boko Haram and Violent Insurgency
Much of the world learnt of the Boko Haram terrorist group after they kidnapped 276 school girls from Chibok in 2014, but for years, its steadily worsening attacks have been racking parts of the country (Smith, 2017). Smith asserted that Boko Haram must be understood in the context of Nigeria‟s current conditions: it is Africa‟s most populous nation, largest economy and biggest oil producer, but astounding levels of corruption have left it without basic development or infrastructure. Disparities between the country‟s north and its south are also important in understanding the conflict. Much of the north badly trails the south in terms of education and wealth due to a complex list of historical, cultural and other factors (Smith, 2017).
Boko Haram began to emerge in 2003, when a collection of like-minded Islamists retreated to a remote area of the northeast called Kanamma. They violently clashed with local authorities. He denied involvement in the violence of 2003 and early 2004. Boko Haramists had been followers of a young, charismatic Islamic preacher named Mohammed Yusuf. Yusuf had a strict, fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur‟an and believed that the creation of Nigeria by British colonialists had imposed a Western and un-Islamic way of life on Muslims.

He later founded his own mosque in Maiduguri; and based on the understanding of the teaching of his
Salafist sect, some of the locals gradually joined the sect and named it Boko Haram, meaning 5
“Western education is forbidden.” However, the group affirmed it wanted to be known by a
phrase that translates to mean “People committed to the Propagation of the Prophet‟s Teachings
and Jihad” (Smith, 2017).

A task force known as Operation Flush II in Maiduguri confronted the sect in 2009 and injured, at least, 17 members of the sect. The leadership of the sect was aggrieved and denounced the security forces. There was violent campaign that stretched for five days. Police Stations were attacked and gunshots were exchanged before the military eventually brutally cracked down the violence (Smith, 2017). About 800 people were killed in this round of violence.
The sect went underground for more than a year after the uprising but resuscitated in 2010 with assassinations and a major raid on a prison under Abubakar Shekau, the Deputy to Yusuf Mohammed, the leader.. The attacks grew more deadly and sophisticated, particularly with the use of explosives. A suicide attacker rammed a car bomb into United Nations (UN) Headquarters at the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, in August 2011, killing 23 people.

It was described as the highest profile of several incidents by International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2015); National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), 2016; Mathias, 2015; Smith, 2017). Incidentally, such violence gradually became frequent in parts of northern and central Nigeria and the insurgency grew even more sophisticated and stronger when a splinter faction, Ansaru emerged by kidnapping foreigners: The sect was responsible for the abduction of a French family of seven in February 2013 (Eze, 2013; Aderogba, 2016; Smith, 2017).

As at 2013, the Boko Haram targeted pupils in a series of awful school attacks in the North-East and killed dozens of boys. Later, there were reports that the group was also kidnapping girls and women with the intent of raping them or making them brides. In April 2014, attackers raided Chibok town (Yobe State) and kidnapped 276 school girls, (of between 16 and 18 years old).
According to Smith (2017), just as Mathias (2010) and Manzo (2016) affirmed, the Boko Haram has been financing itself mainly through ransom kidnappings, bank robberies and other illegal sources. The group is believed to have raided, at least, one Nigerian military arms depot.

Illegal arms were trafficked in West Africa and may not have been difficult for Boko Haram to procure. There have also been accusations of political sponsorship, but little evidence has been offered. “At this point, the insurgency had evolved into a many-headed monster, beyond the control of any one politician” (Smith, 2017).According to Smith, since 2004 small groups of Nigerian Islamists have traveled to northern Mali to train with extremists, from what would later become Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Also, several Nigerian Islamists were suspected to have formed links with al-Shabaab in Somalia or AQIM and its offshoots. However, information remains unverifiable about such links (Aro, 2013; Obuh, Uko-Aviomoh and Ohanaka, 2016).

The demands of the insurgents have often focused on two main areas: the release of Boko Haram prisoners and the creation of an Islamic State. Even though Shekau had pledged solidarity with jihadists globally, the demands of Boko Haram have largely remained local and the insurgency has fed on poverty, hopelessness and unemployment in northern Nigeria (African Union, 2016; Smith, 2015 and 2017).
In response to the insurgency, the Federal Government of Nigeria declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States in May 2013. The military largely responded with heavy-handed raids that resulted in widespread accusations of human right abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Such accusations include “indiscriminate arrests, extra-judicial killings and the burning of homes, places of worship, among others.”

Chronic poverty, corruption, abuses by the security forces and longstanding impunity for the perpetrators of human rights violations coalesced to creating a fertile ground for the emergence of the militant armed groups for over one and a half decades. Since 2003, the attacks have been so violent, deadly and devastating particularly in the northeastern part of the country.
Lives had been lost, property destroyed, and people have been massively displaced from their ancestral homes, deprived of their sources of income, animals and grazing lands have been desecrated, and many have become single parents (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2011; Eze, 2013; IDMC, 2015; Manzo, 2016; Aderogba, 2016). Suffice to say that over 2.5 million Nigerians have become internally displaced from their ancestral homes. Those displaced lack basic necessities of life – water, food, health care delivery system, etc.; and children and women have been the most vulnerable (Mathias, 2015; NEMA, 2016; African Union, 2016; Human Right Watch, 2016; Manzo, 2016). According to IDMC (2016), 207 Local Government Areas were of concern, covering 13 States of Northern Nigeria:

Abuja                     (13,481 IDPs);

Adamawa            (136,010);

Bauchi                   (70,078);

Benue                    (85,393);

Borno                     (1,434,149);

Gombe                  (25,332);

Kaduna                 (36,976);

Kano                      (9,331);
Nasarawa           (37,553);
Plateau                 (77,317);
Taraba                  (50,227);
Yobe                      (131,203); and
Zamfara              (44,929).

Olawale (2016) assays that “having over 2, 000, 000 people in the IDP Camps is saddening, having an insight into what happens within the borders of such camps is horrible.” A Camp Coordinator (Baba IDP) who also doubles as Public Affairs Personnel for the camp, spent some time to reveal the state of the IDPs and the camp since 2009 when Mohammed Yusuf was killed.

In his words:
We appreciate those who do not come here with a jeep or bags of rice, but those young people with human spirit, great talent and ideas that can transform the state of the IDPs....

It is good to donate rice, cartons of noodles, blankets, mosquito nets, bags of cloths but there are other things that can transform lives of IDPs permanently” ...

it is so sad that the government has ignored us, the last ...were packs of mosquito coil, that was in September 2016. Before then (in 2014), .... brought 20 bags of rice, all labelled with GEJ portrait and that was obviously political. ....

Health parastatals are concerned about the outbreak of meningitis; they don‟t know that if one of the IDPs
gets infected, because of the congestion here, the whole community and by extension, Abuja, is threatened. .... our IDPs are now being thrown out of the hospitals.

Hospitals suddenly withdrew subsidy used to treat IDPs, refused to comply with the documented
directive from the Federal Government to treat IDP in government hospitals. ....

We have lots of students but no materials, no teachers. ....
Amidst the 2,539 IDPs in the camp, 713 are youths, 70% of them- females while 520 are women with children. This poses so much on Mrs. Hadiza, whose husband was killed in Borno forcing her to take refuge at the IDP camp... „the mother of the camp‟ who without medical facilities has helped deliver over 100 babies safely .... leveraging on the little traditional medicine she learnt ... despite the many health challenges, absence of hand glove, disinfectant, other anti-natal check-up or treatment, unavailability and/or unaffordability of post-natal treatment.
She remains committed to the IDP [camp].”
The conditions of the camps and the IDPs were the same in Borno, Yobe, Nassarawa, Adamawa, Bauchi, Plateau, Gombe, Kano, Kaduna, Taraba, Zamfara and other States. It is calamitous and devastating for the Nigerian citizens in Nigeria (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010; Smith, 2015 and 2016; NEMA, 2016; Olawale, 2016; Manzo, 2016). The insurgency and the associated bedlam have the attributes of a war.
Consequences of the War and the Insurgency on Socioeconomic Development In 2016, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC,2016) assayed and affirmed that armed conflicts are not clearly defined internationally; and according to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Article 2 states that "all cases of declared war or of any armed conflict that may arise between two or more high contracting parties, even if the state of war is not recognized, the convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a high contracting party even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance". The International
Humanitarian Law works to protect the rights and dignity of civilians during peace and armed conflict with parties to the conflict having legally binding obligations concerning the rights of persons not involved in the conflict. During the Civil War (in the South-East) and with the Boko Haram insurgency (in the northeast), there were conflicts with breaches of human rights and destruction of lives and property.
Just as Hill (2005), Plumper and Neumayer (2006), Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2012) and Babst and Nicole (2012) observed that often, post war effects can be widely spread and can be long term or short term. According to them, soldiers experience war differently than civilians, both suffer in times of war, and women and children suffer unspeakable brutalities. In about the past decade, up to two million of those killed in armed conflicts were children” (United Nations, 2010). The widespread trauma caused by the atrocities, and the suffering of the civilian population, another legacy of these conflicts, have created extensive emotional and psychological stress. The internal wars have taken a larger toll on civilians than state wars. This is due to the increasing trend of making of targeting civilians as collateral damage. The effects also include mass destruction of cities and have long lasting effects on the economy of the
country. These armed conflicts have indirect, significant, negative consequences on infrastructure, provision of public health, and social order.

These indirect consequences are often sometimes overlooked and underappreciated.
Again, just as Hill (2005), Shank (2012) and Babst and Niccole (2012) that have asserted from their experiences from different instances around the globe, Eze (2013), Aro (2013), Nkwede, Abah and Nwankwo (2015), Aderogba (2016), Manzo (2016), Obuh, Uko-Aviomoh and Ohanaka (2016) and NEMA (2016) have reiterated the consequences of “the wars” in Nigeria: Diversion of attention and increased security vote to executing the war and fighting of Boko Haram by the three tiers of government; destruction of Nigeria‟s corporate image; food scarcity; sporadic migration and abandonment of professions, heightened indigenes/settlers dichotomy; discouragement of local and foreign investors; dehumanization of women, children and men; deterioration of the economy; palpable fear among citizens; collapse of tourism
attractions/industry; and increased school drop outs. Indeed, the wars retarded socio-economic development in various ramifications: food insecurity, closed schools, increased schools- dropout, loss of jobs, environmental degradation, industrial stagnation, etc. Essentially, the consequences on sustainability of the nation are retrogressive and sustainable development is persistently in jeopardy. Any repeat of activities that would result in war in Nigeria need ruminating over.

Conclusion and Recommendations
The foregoing has demonstrated that Nigeria experienced its first civil war between 1967 and 1970. The history, traditions, ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social, and religious barriers all hampered the creation of a unified state of Nigeria. The claimed brutal and planned annihilation of officers of Eastern Nigeria origin that cast serious doubt on whether the North and the South could ever sincerely live together as members of a nation led to the Civil War (1967-1970).

Since then, the country has not relapsed into any serious aspersion until 2003 when the Islamist Jihad, Boko Haram, started in Northern Nigeria with huge concentration of the insurgent activities in the Northeastern part of the country. While the civil war in the Southeast lasted just about two and a half years, the rebellion in the Northeast has lasted about ten years. While the civil war was politically stirred, the insurgency was mostly religiously motivated.

Post-civil war threats and risks such as post-conflict governance; nation-building; economic management and development; among others have become more pronounced:. There have been preventable and unwarranted flow of blood, and there have been deliberate attempts at preventing a recurrence of the conflict that may lead to civil war. The devastating Boko Haram insurgent is equally seemingly unwarranted. The insurgency has left many homeless, hungry, sick and in abject poverty and without future.
War should be prevented, and an end should come to the incidence of insurgency perpetrated by Boko Haram. The rudimentary bits and pieces of disenchantment of the civil war should be eliminated, and the internally displaced Nigerians must be secured, resettled and empowered.

There is a humongous number of IDPs in various camps in the northeastern Nigeria. Inherent challenges of the IDPs remain enormous and peculiar mostly to central and state governments, and both the host and the home communities of the IDPs. Women and children are the most vulnerable. Thus, the responsibility of the three levels of government should include but not limited to:

(a) preventing displacement and minimizing its adverse effects on women and children;

(b) raising national and international awareness about the predicaments of the region and the IDPs in particular;

(c) collecting data and information on the number, location and conditions of the IDPs;

(d) supporting and encouraging training and development on the rights of the IDPs;

(e) creating a legal framework that would keep and maintain the rights of the IDPs;

(f) designating an institutional focal point on the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs);
(g) encouraging and supporting national human rights institutions to addressing internal displacement of people;

(h) supporting durable and enduring solutions to the challenges of the displaced;

(i) allocating adequate resources (animate and inanimate), to addressing the internal displacement of people; and

(j) cooperating with the international community when national
capacity and capability are insufficient and required.
The inherent advantages of adult education should be tapped for training, developing and
empowerment of the displaced. All internally displaced should be looked for and brought to the
camps. They should be given holistic orientation about life in the camps. Camp environments
should be made conducive, comfortable and secured. NGOs and philanthropists should not
hesitate to assist the IDPs. Special education and training must be given to them to develop and
empower them in readiness for life after camp.
The training, development and empowerment programmes should be cogent and substantial to equip IDPs with livelihood skills for self-sustenance. Such programmes will quicken the rehabilitation, integration, motivatation and empowerment of IDPs for sustainable community and national growth and development. Undoubtedly, a few of the adult IDPs might have been skilled in certain trades and crafts prior their displacement, and their articles of trades, wares and materials must have been lost while fleeing from their indigenous homes.

Therefore, to start with, skills, as well as equipment for engaging in the following small-scale enterprises could be supplied to such artisans: Fish farming and fish trading; farming and staple food crop production; piggery, poultry farming and raising of different kinds of birds for eggs,meat, pullets, feather, etc.; hairdressing and barbing (males and females); soap and oil making; fashion design and dress making; shoemaking and shoe shining; petty trade and commerce; basic computer operations and word processing; concrete making and bricklaying; carpentry and joinery; dry cleaning and laundry; cleaning and car washing; wristwatch and clock (table and wall) repairs; electrical and electronic installation/repairs; painting and decoration; panel beating and painting; leather works; furniture and interior decoration; petty silvi-culture and horticulture; animal husbandry; pastry making; and others. The skills may require updating or up-grading or retraining.
Thus, there should be collaboration involving Adult Educators, Federal and State Ministries of Education, the Industrial Training Fund (ITF), NEMA and SEMA (of the states 10 concerned) and other organized bodies, as well as philanthropists who may wish to play various humanitarian roles. Every IDP should be supported, encouraged and motivated to learn a trade.

Undoubtedly, such training and development programmes would go a long way in restoring their dignity and ensuring diversification of their means of livelihood. The ITF, in conjunction with Community Educators should provide the skill components, the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency should provide entrepreneurship skills; and the Bank of Industry (BOI) should be directed to support with funds.
Similarly, every child in IDP camps should be made to go through formal education:
crèche, nursery, primary, secondary and tertiary education at the expense of the local, state and or federal governments. .There is need for further research and development into rehabilitation plans for the IDPs. A website should be created to globalise what is going on within and outside the IDP camps.
Financial Institutions, Banks, Foundations, Federal Ministries, Departments and Agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations, Churches and Mosques can help IDPs out of the predicament so that they become wholly integrated into the society.

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